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ABSTRACT
A decoupled" liability system is one in which the award to
the plaintiff differs from the payment by the defendant. The
optimal system of decoupling makes the defendant's payment as
high as possible. Such a policy allows the award to the
plaintiff to be lowered, thereby reducing the plaintiff's
incentive to sue --andhence litigation costs --without
sacrificing the defendant's incentive to exercise care. The
optimal award to the plaintiff may be less than or greater than
the optimal payment by the defendant. The possibility of an
out-of-court settlement does not qualitatively affect these
results. If the settlement can be monitored, it may be desirable
to decouple it as well.
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of Economic Research1. Introduction and Summary
In suits between private individuals, liability usually is coupled" in
the sense that, aside from the parties' litigation costs, a successful
plaintiff receives what the defendant pays. This article studies a system of
decoupledk liability --inwhich the plaintiff is awarded an amount different
from what the defendant is made to pay. If the plaintiff is awarded less than
what the defendant pays, the government obtains the difference; if the
plaintiff is awarded more, the government provides the difference.
Decoupled liability already occurs in certain circumstances. For
example, in several states punitive damages are decoupled, with the plaintiff
receiving 25% to 67% of the punitive danage amount paid by the defendant (the
percentage depends on the state) the rest goes to the state treasury or to a
public compensation fund.1 Also, decoupled liability has been proposed in
the context of private antitrust suits.2
The rationale for decoupling liability that wilL be investigated here is
easily explained. Consider any level of Liability when liability is coupled.
This level of liability will determine the incentive of the victim to sue (the
higher the award, the greater the incentive) and the incentive of the injurer
to take care. The parties' behavior in turn will determine the level of
social costs --assumedto be the sum of the injurer's cost of taking care,
The plaintiff receives 67% of the punitive damage amount in Colorado.
40% in Florida, and 25% in Iowa (under specified circumstances). The
remainder goes to the State General Fund in Colorado, the General Revenue Fund
or the Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund in Florida, and the Civil
Reparations Trust Fund in Iowa. See Cob, Rev. Stat. sec. 13-21-102 (Supp.
1987); Fla. Stat. sec. 768.73(2)-(4); and Iowa Code Se. 668A.l(l)-(2).
2 See, for example, Schwartz (1980, pp. 1092-1096; 1981,pp. 10-15),
Sabop and White (1986, p. 1037), and Polinsky (1986); these articles are
briefly commented upon in note 28 below. (The term "decoupling" apparently
was first used by Salop and White.)
-I-the victim's expected harm, and the parties' expected litigation costs.3
Now consider decoupling liability, starting at the specified level of
coupled liability. First raise the amount paid by the injurer, which will
cause him to take note care. Then lower the amount awarded to the
victim -- whichwill reduce his incentive to sue and thereby cause the injurer
to take less care --untilthe injurer's care is back to its level under
coupled liability. Since the level of care is the same under this decoupled
system and the original coupled system, so is the injurer's cost of taking
care and the victim's expected harm. But since the plaintiff is awarded less
under the decoupled system, he will sue less often and, consequently,
litigation costs will be lower. Thus, starting from any level of coupled
liability, there always exists a decoupled system of liability that reduces
social costs.
This logic also can be used to establish one of the main results of the
article -- thatin the optimal system of decoupled liability the defendant's
payment is as high as possible. For if the payment by the defendant is not at
its upper bound, it is possible to raise the defendant's payment and lower the
plaintiff's award in such a way that the injurer's care is not affected but
the parties' expected litigation costs are lowered.
With the payment by the defendant set at its upper bound, the optimal
award to the plaintiff depends on how the plaintiff's award affects the
injurer's care (through the plaintiff's incentive to sue) and the parties'
litigation costs. The optimal award to the plaintiff minimizes the sum of the
cost of the defendant's care, the expected harm to the victim, and the
expected litigation costs of the parties.
See generally Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1988).
-2-It will be shown that the optimal award to the plaintiff may be less
than or greater than the optimal payment by the defendant. To understand why
either relationship is possible consider two limiting cases involving the
level of harm. As the level of harm approaches zero, the optimal award to the
plaintiff must approach zero; it is not worthwhile to encourage the plaintiff
to sue since the value of inducing the injurer to take care becomes small, and
litigation is costly. In this case, the optimal award to the plaintiff will
be less than the optimal payment by the defendant (which is at its upper
bound). Conversely, as the level of harm becomes large, suits become more
valuable, and it is optimal to continue to raise the award to the plaintiff.
In this case, the optimal award to the pLaintiff will exceed the optimal
payment by the defendant.
Thus far, the discussion has assumed implicitly that all suits result in
trials. In practice, however, most cases settle out of court. It will be
demonstrated that the possibility of a settlement does not affect the result
that the optimal payment by the defendant if the case goes to trial is as high
as possible. This is for two reasons. First, as before, by making the
defendant's payment as high as possible, the award to the plaintiff and his
incentive to sue -canbe lowered. This will reduce either trial costs or
settlement costs (which are assumed to be positive). Second, given a suit, by
raising the defendant's trial payment and lowering the plaintiff's trial
award, the likelihood of a settlement is enhanced because the defendant will
be willing to pay more in settlement and the plaintiff will be willing to
accept less. Increasing the likelihood of a settlement is beneficial because
settlement costs are less than trial costs.
In addition to decoupling the trial outcome, a court sometimes may be
-3-able to monitor, and therefore decouple, the settlement.4 (For instance, in
class action suits, settlements often have to be approved by the court.) It
will be shown that if suits otherwise would not settle, It is beneficial to be
able to decouple settlements. This is because, by decoupling the settlement
as well as the trial outcome, the likelihood of a settlement can be increased,
For example, given any decoupled trial outcome, settling can be made more
attractive if the settlement amount paid by the defendant to the plaintiff is
supplemented by the government.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic
model, in which suits are assumed to result in trials, and Section 3 derives
the optimal system of decoupling in this context. Section 4 extends the model
to include the possibility of settlements. Section 5 derives the optimal
system of detoupling in the extended model, first when only the trial outcome
can be decoupled, and then when both the trial outcome and the settlement can
be decoupled. Section 6 contains several concluding remarks, including about
the prior literature that discusses decoupling liability, and the relationship
between our decoupling analysis and the economic theory of public enforcement.
2. The Basic Model
There is one risk-neutral injurer and many risk-neutral potential
victims. The injurer chooses a level of care that affects the probability of
Although we will refer to a court' as having control over the policy
instruments, in practice liability may be decoupled by an administrative
agency or the legislature. The decoupling of antitrust damages, for example,
presumably would be implemented through Congressional legislation.
-4-an accident.5 If an accident occurs, one of the potential victims is harmed
(hereafter frequently referred to as "the victim"). The level of harm is
fixed and the same for all potential victims. Let
c —injurer'slevel of care,
p(c) —probabilityof an accident (p' <0;p' >0),
—lossif an accident occurs.
Care is measured in units that cost one dollar each, so c also represents the
injurer's cost of care.
If the victim sues the injurer, each side bears its ownlegalcosts.6
Theinjurer'scost of litigation is fixed. Each potential victim's cost of
litigation also is fixed, but is assumed to vary among victims.7 This
variation might be attributed, for example, to differences among individuals
in the value of their time or to differences among lawyers in their fees. Let
a—potentialvictim's trial cost (a >0),
f(s) —probabilitydensity of a (f(a)>0for all a > 0),8
b —injurer'strial cost (b >0).
Although the present article discusses liability in the context of
accidents, it will be clear that the analysis also generally applies to non-
accidental harms, such as antitrust violations.
6 The basic ideas in this article also would apply under other rules for
allocating legal costs, such as the rule that the loser pays the winner's
costs.
7 An equivalent interpretation of this assumption is that there is one
potential victim whose litigation cost is uncertain before an accident but
known after an accident. (An alternative assumption that would generate
similar results is that the level of harm varies among potential victims,
rather than their cost of litigation.)
The assumption that a has positive density for all positive values of a
is made mainly for expositional convenience. See note 14 below for a
discussion of how the results would be affected if this assumption were
changed.
-5-It is assumedwithout loss ofgenerality that the victim will prevail at
trial if he brings a suit.9 The plaintiff then receives an award and the
defendant makes a payment. There is some upper bound on the defendant's
payment. Let
x —awardto the plaintiff at trial,
y —paymentby the defendant at trial,
m —maximumpossible payment of defendant (y ￿ in).
Thedefendant's payment may be bounded for any numberofreasons -- his
limited wealth, considerations of fairness, and so forth. For purposes of our
analysis, it does not matter which reason applies or what the bound is.
If there is an accident, the victim will bring a suit if his trial cost
is less than the award he will receive at trial --thatis, if a C x)0
Thus, the probability that a suit will be brought is F(x), where F(.) is the
cumulative distribution of a.
Given the victim's suit decision and the payment the injurer will have
to make at trial, the injurer will choose his level of care to minimize the
sumofhis cost of care, his expected payment at trial, and his expected trial
cost:
(1) bUN c +p(c)F(x)(y÷ bi.
c
The social problem is to choose the award to the victim and the payment
by the injurer that minimize the sum of the injurer's cost of taking care, the
If the victim were to win at trial with probability less than one, the
qualitative results of our analysis would not be affected. The assumption in
the text corresponds to the rule of strict liability; for a discussion of how
the analysis would apply to a rule of negligence, see comment (a) in section 6
below.
There is no loss of generality in assuming that the victim will not
sue if a —x.
-6-victim's expected harm, and the parties' expected trial costs.11 This
problem ts solved subject to the constraints that there is some upper bound on
the payment by the injurer, and that the victim and the injurer are each
maximizing his own welfare.
Thus, the social problem can be written as
x
(2) KIN c +p(c)(t+ f af(a)da + F(x)b),
x,y 0
where it is understood that c is determined by x and y according to (1). and
that y ￿ m.lZ The integral in (2) is the expected value of the potential
victims' trial cost, conditional on a.suit being brought (that is, for values
of a between 0 and x).
The optimal values of x and y will be denoted x* and y*, It is assumed
that x* is positive and unique.
3. Optimal Decoupling in the Basic Model
It will first be shown that the optimal payment by the injurer at trial
is as high as possible: y* —m.
This can be proved by contradiction. Suppose that the optimal value of
y were y0 'c m and that the optimal value of x were some x0 > 0. Then, if an
accident occurs, the sum of the injurer's expected payment at trial and his
expected trial cost is F(x0)[y0 + bi. Now raise yotom and lower x,0 to
such that
The injurer's payment and the victim's award are not added to or
subtracted from this sum because they are transfers of income rather than
social costs or benefits.
12 Both (1) and (2) already incorporate the constraint that the victim
will bring a suit if a Cx.
-7-(3) F(x0)[y0 +bJ—F(x1flm+bJ.
By construction, the expected costs borne by the injurer if there is an
accident are unchanged. Therefore, the injurer will choose the same level of
care as before: see (1). Now observe from the social problem (2) that the sum
of the injurer's cost of care and the victim's expected loss is unaffected,
but that, because x is lower, both the victim's and the injurer's expected
trial cost are reduced. Thus, the original Yc and x,0 could not have been
optimal.
Given y' —m,the optimal award to the victim, x*, can be determined by
minimizing the objective function in (2) just over x, where c now is
determined by x from
(6) FUN c +p(c)F(x)(m+b.
c
It is clear from (4) that the injurer's care c is increasing in the victim's
award x (since raising x raises F(x), the probability that a suit will be
brought). Let c(x) be the solution to (4), with c >0.
The first-order condition (recall chat a unique interior solution is
assumed) that determines the optimal award to the victim, x*, can be written
as
x
(5) .p'c'(( 4-J af(a)da+F(x)b)—c'+pf(x)[x+b).
0
The left-hand side of (5) is the marginal benefit of raising x. As x goes up,
the injurer's care rises and the probability of an accident therefore falls.
The fall in the accident probability reduces the expected harm to the victim
and the expected trial cost of both parties (trials can only occur if an
accident occurs). The right-hand side of (5) is the marginal cost of raising
-8-x. The marginal cost consists of the increased care that the injurer ia
induced to take, and the increase in the parties' expected trial costs caused
by the greater likelihood that a suit will be brought (the increase in trial
costs is x +bbecause, for the "marginal" suit, a —x).
It should be clear at this point that there is no simple relationship
between the opcimal award to the victim, x*, and the optimal payment by the
injurer, y*. The factors that determine x* -- suchas the responsiveness of
the accident probability to the injurer's choice of care, end the magnitude of
the parties' trial costs -mayhave nothing per Se to do with the factors
that determine y* --suchas the injurer's wealth or considerations of
fairness.
In general, x* may be less than or greater than y*. To illustrate the
former possibility, consider what happens to x* and y* as the victim's loss,
t, approaches zero. For the usual reason, y* remains at In.But x* must
approach zero as t approaches zero. This can be demonstrated by
contradiction. Suppose that x* is bounded away from 0, say by i>0. ,This
implies some minimum level of care, say & > 0.13 Thus, sociaL costs at x*
are at least &.Comparethis to social costs when x —0;then, since there
are no suits, c is zero and social costs are simply p(Ofl. But as
approaches 0, these social costs approach 0, and become less than &.
Therefore,x* must also approach 0 as t approaches zero, showing that for I
13 That &mustbe positive can be proved by contradiction. Suppose
x* > 0 and &— 0.Then social welfare could be improved by setting x —0
(since the level of care would be the same and expected trial costs would be
lower). So it must be that c > 0 when x* > 0.
.9.low enough, x* Cy*,'4
By similar reasoning, it can be demonstrated chat as t tends to
infinity, x' tends to infinity. The details are omitted here, but the
intuition is straightforward. As t tends to infinity, the value of taking
additional care to reduce the probability of an accident increases without
bound. The only way to induce the defendant to take more care is by raising
the award to the plaintiff, x, so that the defendant will be sued with a
higher probability if an accident occurs.(The defendants payment cannot be
raised because y* —in.)Therefore x* also must tend to infinity as I tends
to infinity, showing that for £ sufficiently large, x* >
-
Ingeneral, as suggested by the preceding discussion, x is an
increasing function of the magnitude of the loss, 1.16 Thus, for accidents
with relatively low losses, x* will be less than y*, and for accidents with
relatively high losses, x* will be greater than y*.
14 If the trial costs ofpotential victims have a positive lower bound,
then x* would tend to that lower bound as £ tends to zero. Assuming this
lower bound is less than y* —a,then for £ low enough, x* Cy*,as claimed.
However, if the lower bound exceeds m, then x* always would exceed y*.
(Analogous observations apply to the discussion in the next paragraph if the
trial costs of victims have an upper bound.)
15 A potential problem withsetting x greater than y is that this creates
an incentive for individuals to "fabricate" harms -.toclaim that an accident
has occurred when one has not in order to obtain the implicit government
subsidy equal to x -y.If individuals cannot be deterred from fabricating
harms (say by criminal penalties), it may be desirable to narrow the "gap
between x and y.
16 It can be seen from (5) thatraising I does not affect the marginal
cost of raising x, but it does increase the marginal benefit of raising x.
-10I. TheExtended Model
The model of section 2 will be modified to allow for the possibility of
a settlement in the following way. After an accident occurs, the plaintiff
makes a "take it or leave it" settlement demand)7 If it is accepted by the
defendant, the case is settled for this amount. During the settlenent
process, both parties incur settlement costs (which are assumed to be less
than their respective trial costs))8 If the plaintiff's settlement demand
is rejected by the defendant, the plaintiff then decides whether to go to
trial or to drop the suit. For simplicity, both parties are assumed to have
perfect information (including about each other's litigation costs). Let
s —plaintiff'ssettlement demand,
a(a) —plaintiff'ssettlement cost (0 Ca(a)<a),'9
a— defendant'ssettlement cost (0 <fi C b).
It is assumed that a is increasing in a (a plaintiff's trial cost), end that
the gap between a and a also is increasing in a. These assumptions would be
satisfied, for example, if a plaintiff's settlement cost is a constant
fraction of his trial cost.
First observe that, as before, a plaintiff will bring a suit if and only
This assumption is not as special as it may appear; results
qualitatively similar to those discussed in this article generally would occur
if the injurer made a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer (but see note 23
below).
It will be seen that decoupling liability always is socially valuable
when settlement costs are positive, whereas if settlement costs are zero,
there are some circumstances in which decoupling liability is socially
valuable and other circumstances in which it is not needed. The assumption
that settlement costs are positive is made both to avoid the additional
complexity of having to distinguish between these two sets of circumstances
and because it is the more realistic assumption.
£9 When there can be no confusion, a(a) will be written simply as a.
-II-if his trial cost is less than his trial award: a < x, This result can be
explained as follows. If a is less than x, then clearly the plaintiff would
bring a suit even if it were to result in a trial; since a settlement makes
him at least as well off as the trial outcome (otherwise he would not agree to
the settlement), his incentive to sue is at least as great if the suit might
result in a settlement. If a is greater than x, then the plaintiff would not
bring a suit if it were to result in a trial. The defendant, knowing this,
will reject any settlement demand; and the plaintiff will then drop the suit.
In other words, if the plaintiff's trial cost exceeds his award at trial, he
cannot obtain a settlement from the defendant because his threat to sue is not
credible. Thus, the plaintiff wilL bring a suit if and only if a C x.
Given a suit, next consider whether a settlement is feasible, If the
plaintiff goes to trial his net gain is x -a,the award less his trial cost.
If he settles, his net gain is s -a,the settlement amount less his
settlement cost. Thus, the plaintiff will prefer to settle if 5- a￿X.a
or, equivalently, sx.(aa) 20If the defendant goes to trial his
totalpayment is y +b,the payment to the government plus his trial cost,
whereas ifhesettles his total payment is s +a. thesettlement amount plus
hissettlement cost. Thus, the defendant will prefer to settle provided
+?'C y + b or s 'C y + (b -ji).Consequently, a settlement will be feasible
if
(6) x -(a-a)￿ y +(b.a).
If the plaintiff's award is less than or equal to the defendant's
payment (x ￿ y), then (6) always will be satisfied. But if the plaintiff's
20 There is no loss of generality inassuming that the plaintiff prefers
to settle when $ —x-(a-a).An analogous statement applies below to the
defendant.
12award exceeds the defendant's payment Cx >y)a settlement might not be
feasible -
Whena settlement is feasible, a settlement will occur and will equal
(7) s —
Thisis because it is in the plaintiff's interest to make his take-it-or-
leave-it settlement demand as high as possible, provided it will be acceptable
to the defendant, If a settlement is not feasible --thatis, if (6) does not
hold --thena suit will result in a trial.2'
Now consider the injurer's choice of care. If a suit results in a
trial, the injurer's total payment is y +b.If a suit results in a
settlement, the injurer's total payment is s +P or,using (7), y +b.In
other words, the injurer pays y +bwhenever he is sued, regardless of whether
the suit goes to trial or settles. This is because the plaintiff's settlement
demand makes the injurer indifferent between going to trial and settling,
Thus, since the plaintiff's suit decision and the injurer's total payment is
the same as in the basic model, the injurer's choice of care is determined as
in the basic model, according to (1).
Before describing the social problem, it is necessary to define a
threshold level of the plaintiff's trial cost -- denoted- - suchthat a
trial will occur if the plaintiff's trial cost is below ,anda settlement
will occur if the plaintiff's trial cost is above 22 Intuitively, one
2! In most economic models of litigation,a trial can occur only if there
is asymmetric information (or a difference of opinion) about the plaintiff's
probability of prevailing or the magnitude of the harm. Here, even though the
parties' have perfect information, a trial might occur because of the
decoupling of liability (when the plaintiff's award sufficiently exceeds the
defendant's payment).
22 The precise definition of iiscontained in the appendix.
-13-would expect such an itoexist since the higher the plaintiff's trial cost,
the greater the benefit to the plaintiff of settling. In general, imaybe
zero -- inwhich case a suit always will result in a settlement -- orA may
exceed the plaintiff's award, x --inwhich case a suit always will result in
a trial. For purposes of discussion here, i-is assumed to be positive and
less than x; then iisdefined by the level of the plaintiffs trial cost that
satisfies with equality the condition for a settlement to be feasible (6):
(8) x -(i-a(A))—y+(b-fi).
Thesocial problem now can be written as
A x
(9) KIN c +p(cflt+J (a+b)f(a)da+(a(a)+#)f(a)da],
x,y 0 a
where c is determined by x and y according to (I)-, Aisdetermined by x and y
according to (8), and y ￿ m. The first integral in (9) is the parties'
expected trial costs and the second integral is their expected settlement
costs.
5. Optimal Decoupling in the Extended Model
There are two natural cases to consider, depending on whether the
settlement can be observed and decoupled by the court (in addition to the
trial outcome being decoupled).
5.1 Settlements Cannot be Decoupled
The principal result to be demonstrated in this case is that the optimal
payment by the defendant at trial remains as high as possible: y* —m.A
general proof of this proposition (without any assumptions about A)is
contained in the appendix. An informal argument will be presented here.
The structure of the argument is similar to that used to prove the
-14-corresponding result in the basic model. Suppose that the optimal value of y
were less than m and that the optimal value of x is positive. This would lead
to some level of care, chosen by the injurer according to (I). Now raise y
and lower x so that F(x)[y +b]and therefore the injurer's care, is held
constant. Since in the social problem (9) the sum of the injurer's cost of
care and the victi&s expected loss is unaffected, the only question concerns
what happens to the parties' expected trial costs and expected settlement
costs.
With x lower, the range of the plaintiff's trial cost, a, over which a
suit will bebrought becomessmaller. Because the suits that are discouraged
are those that would have settled (since iisassumed to be less than x), this
effect of lowering x reduces expected settlement costs. Also, for those suits
that are still brought, raising y and lowering x towers i,thethreshold level
of the plaintiff's trial cost below which a suit results in a trial (see (8)).
So expected trial costs fall too. Since raising y and lowering x reduces both
settlement costs and trial costs, the original y less than m could not have
been optimal.
The proof that y" —min the extended model may be compared with the
corresponding proof itt the basic model. In both models, lowering the
plaintiff's award x is beneficial because it discourages costly suits; But in
the extended model there is the additional effect that raising y and lowering
x has on the trial-versus-settlement decision. This effect is beneficial
too --forby raising the defendant's trial payment and lowering the
plaintiff's trial award, the likelihood of a settlement is enhanced (the
defendant will be willing to pay nore in settlement and the plaintiff will be
willing to accept less).
-15-Given y* —m,the optimal choice of x is determined in a way similar to
that discussed in the basic model. However, the marginal benefit of raising x
now is lower because the resulting fall in the probability of an accident
reduces expected settlement costs rather than expected trial costs (for suits
in which a ￿ A). The marginal cost of raising x may be lower or higher. It
tends to be lower because, as x rises, the •marginal" plaintiff (one for whom
a —x)will settle rather than go to trial. But the marginal cost of raising
x tends to be higher because raising x makes settling less attractive for
"inframarginal" plaintiffs (see (6)). Thus, x* in the extended model raybe
greater or less than x' in the basic model.
The observations made in the basic model about the relationship between
x* and y* carry over essentially unchanged to the extended model. Thus, for
accidents with relatively low losses, x* will be less than y*, and for
accidents with relatively high losses, x* will be greater than y*.
Finally, it might be wondered whether it is socially desirable to
discourage settlements when they cannot be decoupled, since they might
undermine the beneficial effects of decoupling the trial outcome. Given the
assumption that the plaintiff makes a take-it-or-leave-it settlement demand
resulting in a settlement at the upper end of the settlement range --itis
not desirable to discourage settlements. In essence, this is because the
injurer's incentive to take care then is not diminished by a settlement; and
since settlenents are less costly than trials, they are desirable.23
23 However, if the defendantwere to make a take.it.or-leave-it
settlement offer in our model, it might be socially desirable to discourage
settlements if they cannot be decoupled. For then settlements would occur at
the lower end of the settlement range; the injurer consequently would take
less care: and the lesser cost of settlements would have to be balanced
against their reduced deterrent effect. The potential undesirability of
settlements in the context of decoupling was first noted by Schwartz (1980, p.
-165.2 Settlements Qjk Decoupled
It is assumed in this case that the court can observe the settlement
amount, s, and then award an additional amount to the plaintiff and/or make
the defendant pay an additional amount. Let
—additionalaward to the victim if there is a settlement,
y—additionalpayment by the injurer if there is a settlement.
The main point to be developed in this case is that if suits otherwise
would not settle, it is desirable to decouple settlements because suits can
thereby be encouraged to settle. It also will be shown that when decoupling
settlements is beneficial, the additional award to the victim, x'
•exceedsthe
additional payment by the injurer, y' --resultingin, on balance, a transfer
to the parties from the government. As before, intuitive arguments will be
emphasized here, with formal proofs provided in the appendix.
First note that even if settlements cannot be decoupled, all suits might
settle. In particular this will be true if x y +(b-9),since then a
settlement will be feasible regardless of a; see (6). Thus, decoupling
settlements can be valuable only when some suits otherwise would result in
trials, that is when
(10) x- (a-a) >
for some a, which implies that
(11) x >
If (11) holds, there will be a range of a, starting at zero, over which a suit
will result in a trial. Condition (11) will be assumed to hold for the
remainder of this section.24
1095).
24 Note that this is equivalent to assuming that i> 0.
-17-To see how decoupling settlements can encourage suits to settle,
consider the feasibility of a settlement when both the trial outcome and the
settlement are decoupled. If the plaintiff goes to trial his net gain is
x -a,whereas if he settles, his net gain is s -a+it'. Theplaintiff will
prefer to settle if s ￿ x -(a-a)-x'.If the defendant goes to trial his
total payment is y +b,whereas if he settles his total payment is s +/3+y'
The defendant will prefer to settle if s ￿ y 4-(b-/3)- y.Therefore, a
settlement will be feasible if
(12) it- (a-a)
-it' ￿y +(b-/3)-y'.
Given any x and y, it is straightforward to show that it'andy' can be
chosen so that (12) is satisfied for all values of a.If a —0(the value of
a least favorable to a settlement), any combination of it'andy such that
(13) it,- y'￿ it- N + (b-j3))
will satisfy (12), If a is positive, any combination of it'andy' satisfying
(13) will satisfy (12) as well.
Observe that, using (11), (13) implies that it'- y'must be positive and
sufficiently large. In other words, to encourage settlements when they
otherwise would not occur, the government must decouple settlements in such a
way as to provide a net transfer to the parties. This result should not be
surprising since a net transfer increases the attractiveness to the parties of
a settlement relative to a trial.
Clearly, the optimal values of it'andy' are not uniquely determined.
Without loss of generality one can assume that (13) is satisfied with
equality.23 Even then, there are many combinations of x' and y' that will
25 This assumption could beJustified on the grounds that raising
government revenue generally results in a deadweight burden, so it is better
to raise the smallest amount necessary.
-isassure a settlement. One solution is to set the additional payment by the
injurer equal to zero and then to supplement the settlement payment to the
victim by a positive amount (equal to x -(y+(b-i1)]).
Assuming x' and y' are chosen so as to guarantee a settlement, it can be
shown, once again, that y* —m,Only the first steps of this argument will be
presented here.
Because the plaintiff's settlement demand will be as high as possible
subject to its acceptability by the defendant, the settlement amount will
equal
(14) s —y+(b-P) - y'.
The injurer's total payment as a result of the settlement is a +j3+y'or,
using (14), y +b.(The reason the injurer's total payment does not depend on
y' is that the payment of y' to the government reduces the settlement amount
by y'.) For now famiLiar reasons, it is optimal to set y as high as possible
so that x can be lowered, thereby reducing the incentive to sue. Since all
suits result in settlements (given x' and y'), this lowers the parties'
expected settlenent costs.
The discussion thus far has assumed that the purpose of decoupling
settlements is to encourage settlements when they otherwise would not occur.
It is now straightforward to see that decoupling settlements for this reason
is socially desirable. When settlements are decoupLed, the injurer's total
payment as a result of a settlement was shown in the previous paragraph to be
y +b;this is the same as the total payment if the case goes to trial. Thus,
the decoupling of settlements does not affect the injurer's incentive to take
-19-care, but it does lower litigation costs.
Given y* —m,the determination of x* and the comparison of x* to y* are
essentially as described in the basic model.
And since it was not desirable to discourage settlements when
settlements cannot be decoupled, it clearly is not desirable to discourage
them when they can be decoupled.
6. Concluding Remarks
This section contains observations about: the applicability of our
analysis to a negligence rule; the relationship of the analysis to the
economic theory of public enforcement; the prior literature that discusses
decoupling liability; and the informational requirements of a system of
decoupling.
(a) Applicability to a neglizence In our model of decoupling, it
was assumed implicitly that the injurer's choice of care did not affect
whether he was liable. This is equivalent to assuming that the rule of
liability is strict liability. A natural question is whether the analysis of
decoupling also applies to a negligence rule -- underwhich the injurer is
liable only if he does not take some minimum level of care, referred to as the
standard of care.
26 There is a potential detrimental effect from decoupling settlements.
A victim whose trial cost exceeds the trial award might nonetheless sue and
then settle with the injurer in order for the parties to obtain the net
transfer (x' -y')from the government. However, since the injurer knows that
such a victim would drop the suit if the injurer rejects the victim's
settlement demand, the injurer would have to be to settle the
suit -- eitherby the victim through a negative" settlement (s < 0) or by the
government through a Thegative" additional payment (y' < 0). Consequently,
such suits can be forestalled by a policy of decoupling settlements only if
the settlement amount is positive and by restricting the additional payment by
the injurer to be non-negative.
-20-In theory decoupling liability would not be necessary under a
negligence rule for the following reason. If the standard of care corresponds
to the first-best level of care (the level of care that minimizes the sum of
the cost of care and the expected harm) and the level of liability for
violating the standard is high enough, the injurer vill meet the standard.
Then the victim will not sue since he would not prevail. Thus, in principle,
the first-best level of care could be attained without any litigation costs
being incurred. There would be no reason to decouple liability in these
circumstances.
In practice, however, a negligence rule is likely to lead to some suits
for the following reasons. The injurer may be uncertain about what the
standard of care is, and therefore may choose a level of care that leads with
some probability to his being found negligent. Conversely, a court or a jury
may be uncertain about what level of care was chosen by the injurer, and
consequently may find him negligent with some probability. In general,
therefore, a negligence rule can be characterized as a schedule of the
probability of liability as a function of the injurer's care; the higher the
injurer's care, the lower the chance of his being found liable.
Given this more realistic view of the negligence rule, it is
straightforward to see that the analysis of decoupling in this article applies
under a negligence rule as well. Whatever level of care results from the best
choice of coupled liability under a negligence rule, the same level of care
can be achieved with lower litigation costs by decoupling liability in the way
described here,
(b) Relationship to the economic theory of public enforcement. The
analysis of decoupling liability in this article closely parallels the
-21-economic theory of public enforcement associated with Becker (1968). Becker
observed that the same amount of deterrence can be achieved by catching an
injurer infrequently and fining him severely as by catching him more often and
fining him less. He concluded that the best system of public enforcement
involves using the highest possible fine and a correspondingly low probability
of detection, since such a combination can achieve any given amount of
deterrence with the lowest investment in detection resources.
The rationale for making the defendant's payment as high as possible in
a system of decoupled liability is, in essence, the same es Becker's rationale
for high fines in a system of public enforcement. Under public enforcement, a
high fine allows the probability of detection to be lowered; under decoupled
liability, a high payment allows the probability of a suit to be lowered. In
both cases, enforcement costs are saved. Thus, one could interpret our
analysis of decoupling as providing a private litigation analogue to Becker's
theory of public enforcement.
Becker's theory of public enforcement has been criticized on the grounds
that severe fines -.potentiallyas high as an individual's wealth --hardly
ever are imposed. An analogous criticism could be leveled against the theory
of decoupling liability proposed here. In both contexts, however, there are
additional considerations that could be taken into account in the analysis
that would lead to the conclusion that the optimal fine or the optimal payment
by the defendant is not as high as possible. For example, if injurers are
risk averse it generally is desirable to reduce the sanction and to increase
the probability of its imposition in order to lower risk-bearing costs.27
27 For a review of other reasons why optimal sanctions are not at their
upper bound, see, for example, Carr-Hill and Stern (1979, pp. 281-295).
-22-(c) Literature relevant to decoupling, The literature most relevant to
our analysis is concerned with the private enforcement of public
fines '-wherebythe first private enforcer to discover and report the injurer
receives the fine. See, for example, Becker and Stigler (1974, pp. 13-16),
Landes and Posner (1975), and Polinsky (1980). Landes and Posner emphasized
that private enforcement would lead to socially excessive enforcement, and
that a tax on private enforcers therefore might be desirable. Polinsky showed
that private enforcement also could lead to too little enforcement and that a
subsidy to private enforcers might be needed. In other words, to use the
language of the present article, it may be desirable to "decouple the
injurer's payment and the enforcer's award, with the enforcer receiving either
less than or more than the fine.28
The results just summarized were developed in a framework in which
anyone could become a private enforcer, not just the victim of the harm.
Thus, one could view our contribution as extending this analysis to a setting
that is more descriptive of private litigation systems --inwhich the victim
of the harm normally is the sole initiator of a suit.29
Several other reasons have been advanced for decoupling Liability,
although they are unrelated to the rationale presented here. For example, if
28 The literature referred to in this paragraph has been applied to
private antitrust enforcement in the articles cited in note 2 above. Although
those articles advocated decoupling liability and anticipated some of the
results demonstrated here, they did not analyze a formal model of decoupling
or systematically consider the possibility of settlements,
Other recent articles concerned with private litigation have mentioned
a decoupling-type solution, The discussion that is closest in spirit to the
present analysis is by Hylton (1990, pp. 164-165 & 169-170). He assumes that
the award to the victim equals the victim's loss, and shows that the optimal
payment by the injurer exceeds this amount. See also Katz (1990, pp. 19-20)
and Polinsky and Shavell (1989, pp. 105-107).
-23harms are nonmonetary (such as pain and suffering), there is a conflict
between optimally compensating victims and optimally deterring injurers. In
terms of risk-allocation; the victim should be awarded relatively little
(assuming his marginal utility of money is not much affected). in terms of
deterrence, however, the injurer should be made to pay an amount reflecting
how much the victim values preventing the harm from occurring in the first
place. Thus, only by decoupling liability is it possible to achieve both
optimal compensation and optimal deterrence)°
(d) Informational requirements. If a government agency were to attempt
to optimally design a decoupled system of liability, a substantial amount of
information would be required. The agency would need to know how changes in
the plaintiff's award would affect his incentive to sue; how changes in the
probability of suit would affect the injurer's choice of care; how this choice
would affect the sum of the cost of care and the expected harm; and whether a
suit would result in a trial or a settlement.
Although the information required to implement an ideal decoupling
system is substantial, two points should be kept in mind. First, the agency
does not have to know with great precision everything referred to in the
previous paragraph. It simply has to have some estimate .-possiblyquite
imperfect -- ofthe required information. Second, essentially .th in
informationwould be needed determine ptimal level of counled
liability. Thus, if it is worthwhile to select the level of coupled liability
on the basis of how liability affects care and litigation, then it is better
30 This point iswidely recognized in the literature on liability. See,
for example, Spence (1977) and Shavell (1987, pp. 228-235). Additional
arguments for decoupling liability have been discussed, for example, by
Shavell (1987, pp. 29-30 & 142-144).
-24-to use that information to design a system of decoupled liability.
In practice, rather than attempting to determine the ideal
decoupling
system, it may be preferable to develop relatively simple rules of thumb. For
exampte, one rule might be to treat cases differently on the basis of the size
of the loss. For low-loss cases, the plaintiff could be awardedsome fraction
of what the defendant pays (in order to discourage excessive litigation), and
for high-loss cases the plaintiff could be awarded some multiple of what the
defendant pays.3'
The rationale for this suggestion is based on the observation in
section 2 that x* c y* if the loss is sufficiently low, and x > y* if the
loss is sufficiently high.
-25-Appendix
proposition 1: When settlements are possible but cannot be decoupled,
the optimal payment by the defendant at trial is as high as possible: yt —in.




ifx > y + (b -0),and â(x. y) —0otherwise. Since £x, y) Is increasing in
x and decreasing in y (in the weak sense), so is i. For a plaintiff with
a < i, a suit resulting in a trial occurs and litigation costs a + b are
incurred; for a plaintiff with A a < x, a suit resulting in a settlement
occurs and settlement costs a + 0 are incurred; and for a plaintiff with
a ￿ x, a suit does not occur.
The social problem can be written as:
x








(A3) c c argxain c + p(c)F(x)[y + b],
(A4) y ￿ in.
To prove that the second constraint (Al.) is binding, suppose to the
contrary that at the optimal choice (x0, y0). Yo < m. Now consider an
alternative choice (x1, Yi with Yo 'C y1 in and F(x1)[y1 + b] —F(x0)(y0+ bi.
Thus, x1 < x0. It follows from the construction of the new pair (x1, Yt) that
the choice of the level of care c remains unchanged. But the value of the
objective function (expected social cost) Is lower under the new pair
-26y1), since the first term involving an integral in (A2) is
strictly
increasing in x, and the second term involving an integral is
weakly
increasing in x and weakly decreasing in y (since aisweakly increasing in x
and weakly decreasing in y).
Remark: It was assumed in section 4 of the text thatwas positive and
less than x. In that case, A —A.The.proof here does not impose any
assumptions on a.
Proposition Z: When settlements are possible and can be decoupled:(i)
Decoupling settlements is valuable only if some suits otherwise would not
settle (i.e., only if x >y+(b-$3));(ii) When decoupling settlements is
valuable, optimal decoupling of settlements requires a minimum net transferto
the parties from the government (at least equal to x -[y+(b-$3)]>0);
(iii) The optimal payment by the defendant at trial is y* —is.
Proof:Letzdenote the settlement subsidy to the two parties. (In
terms of the notation of section 5.2, z •x'- y';the allocation of the
subsidy does not matter.) To prove (i) and (ii), it suffices to show that the
optimal policy involves a subsidy z —0if x y +(b -$3), and
zx-ft+(b-B))if x >y+(b-$3).
Analogouslyto the proof of Proposition I, define i(x, y, z)
min(A(x, y, z), x), where A(x, y, z) solves for a in
(AS) x -(a-a(a))—y+(b-$3)+z
if x >y+(b-$3), andA(x, y, z) —0otherwise. The social problem can be
written as:
27 -'C






subject to (P3) and (A4). Since is weakly increasing in x and weakly
decreasing in y, y* —m(or the same reason as before, proving (iii).
Observe that the choice of the subsidy z does not affect the level of
care c chosen by the injurer. Thus, if x >y+(b.U), anyz ￿
x -(y+(b-j3)J > 0minimizes expected social cost by letting
i(x, y, z) —0:and if x y +(b-U). sincei— 0anyway, z —0is optimal
(but not uniquely).
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